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Note 
 
HERNANDEZ V. MESA: PRESERVING THE ZONE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY AT THE BORDER 
ALEXANDRA A. BOTSARIS 
In Hernandez v. Mesa,1 the Court declined to address whether a Mexi-
can citizen standing on Mexican soil was entitled to Fourth Amendment2 pro-
tections when fatally shot by a United States Border Patrol Agent standing 
across the border in United States territory.3  This case exposes two critical 
problems facing our southwest border—the use of excessive force by Border 
Patrol agents and the lack of judicial remedy available to those subjected.  
While the Supreme Court’s willingness to hear the issue reaffirms its im-
portance, the Court has yet to provide significant guidance on how to apply 
the Constitution extraterritorially to resolve these disputes.  By remanding 
the case back to the Fifth Circuit,4 the Court left the law at a standstill where 
an immediate solution is necessary. 
In Part I, this Note will provide a summary of the factual and procedural 
circumstances leading to the Court’s opinion.5  Part II will explore the evo-
lution of the extraterritorial doctrine in the context of constitutional applica-
tion and will introduce the historical foundations of the Fourth Amendment.6  
Part III will explain the reasoning behind the Court’s decision.7  Finally, in 
Part IV, this Note will (1) present the context that gave rise to Agent Mesa’s 
fatal shooting of Hernández and explain how Border Patrol agents operate 
within an environment that fosters incidents of excessive force;8 (2) argue the 
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 1.  137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 3.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005–08. 
 4.  Id. at 2006. 
 5.  See infra Part I.  
 6.  See infra Part II. 
 7.  See infra Part III.  
 8.  See infra Section IV.A. 
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Court should have extended Fourth Amendment protections by adopting the 
functional approach established in Boumediene v. Bush9 to provide a civil 
remedy to Hernández’s family and deter similar actions by Border Patrol 
agents;10 and (3) contend that extending a remedy is consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment’s historical purpose.11 
I.  THE CASE 
On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernández Güereca (“Hernández”), a 
fifteen-year-old Mexican boy, was playing a game with his friends in the 
empty culvert that separates the United States and Mexico.12  This area of the 
culvert is near the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry, an international port between 
El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico.13  The boys would 
run up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed-wire fence on the United 
States’ side of the border and then run back down into Mexico.14 
During the game, United States Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. 
(“Agent Mesa”) arrived by bicycle and apprehended one of Hernández’s 
friends.15  Hernández withdrew to the Mexican side of the border and hid 
behind a pillar of the railroad bridge that reaches across the culvert.16  While 
standing on American soil, Agent Mesa fired at least two shots across the 
border toward Hernández—one of which hit Hernández in the face and killed 
him.17  Agent Mesa, and the other United States Border Patrol Agents who 
responded to the incident, eventually left the scene without providing aid to 
Hernández.18  Hernández, who, according to the complaint, was “unarmed 
and unthreatening” throughout the encounter,19 was pronounced dead after 
Mexican authorities finally arrived.20 
                                                          
 9.  553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 10. See infra Section IV.B.  While there are other grounds for relief, this Note will solely focus 
on the avenues available through the Fourth Amendment. 
 11.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 12.  Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated 
sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017); see Culvert, THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining the term as “[a] channel, conduit, or tunneled drain of masonry 
or brick-work conveying a stream of water across beneath a canal, railway embankment, or road”). 
 13.  Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 837. 
 14.  Id.  The border between the two countries runs through the middle of the culvert.  Hernan-
dez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017). 
 15.  Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 837; Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005. 
 16.  Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 837. 
 17.  Id. at 837–38.  
 18.  Id. at 838. 
 19.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005.  
 20.  Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
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A.  Preliminary Investigation & District Court Ruling 
After the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) declined to discipline Agent 
Mesa,21 Hernández’s parents sued the United States, Agent Mesa, his super-
visors, and unknown federal employees, alleging eleven claims against the 
defendants.22  Claims One through Seven were brought under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)23 “based on multiple allegations of tortious con-
duct.”24  Claim Eight asserted the United States infringed upon Hernandez’s 
Fourth25 and Fifth Amendment26 rights.27  Claim Nine contended the United 
States “failed to adopt policies that would have prevented a violation of Her-
nández’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights.”28  Claim Ten purported 
Agent Mesa was liable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics29 for using “excessive, deadly force” in violation of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.30  In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs 
                                                          
 21.  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigated the incident and concluded that Agent 
Mesa “did not act inconsistently with [Customs and Border Patrol] policy or training regarding use 
of force,” and “there was insufficient evidence” to accuse Agent Mesa of a federal civil rights vio-
lation.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005 (quoting Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Af-
fairs, Federal Officials Close Investigation into the Death of Sergio Hernandez-Guereca (Apr. 27, 
2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-investigation-death-sergio-hernan-
dez-guereca).  Specifically, the DOJ found that the incident “occurred while smugglers attempting 
an illegal border crossing hurled rocks from close range at a [Customs and Border Patrol] agent who 
was attempting to detain a suspect.”  Id. (same).  The DOJ noted, “Hernández ‘was neither within 
the borders of the United States nor present on U.S. property, as required for jurisdiction to exist 
under the applicable federal civil rights statute.’”  Id. (same). 
 22.  Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838.  In this Section, Jesus C. Hernández and Maria Gua-
dalupe Guereca Bentacour, the parents of the victim, will be collectively referred to as “the plain-
tiffs.” 
 23.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012).  The court stated: 
The FTCA allows a person to sue the United States for the negligence or other tortious conduct of 
its employees acting within the scope of employment in situations where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the 
tort occurred. 
Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West 2011)). 
 24.  Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 
117 (5th Cir. 2015); see Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (listing the specific FTCA claims 
brought by the plaintiffs).   
 25.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment establishes, “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment provides, “[n]o person shall 
be . . . deprived of life [or] liberty . . . without due process of law.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
 27.  Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
 30.  Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 
117 (5th Cir. 2015).  Under Bivens, an individual may bring a cause of action against “a federal 
agent for money damages when the federal agent has allegedly violated that person’s constitutional 
rights.”  Id. at 272 (quoting Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 622 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006)); 
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added Agent Mesa’s supervisors to the Bivens action, claiming they too vio-
lated Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.31  Lastly, Claim 
Eleven was grounded in the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”),32 claiming Hernán-
dez’s death was a violation of “international treaties, conventions and the 
Laws of Nations.”33 
The United States moved to dismiss Claims One through Nine and 
Claim Eleven for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the plaintiffs’ 
failure to establish the facts necessary to warrant relief.34  The district court 
ultimately granted the United States’ motion, which removed the United 
States from the case.35  Regarding the plaintiff’s FTCA claims, the district 
court found the FTCA’s foreign country exception, which grants “immunity 
[to] Government employees against liability from torts arising in a foreign 
country,”36 applied since Hernández was injured in Mexico.37  Accordingly, 
the district court dismissed Claims One through Seven.38  Based on similar 
reasoning, the court also dismissed Claim Eight and Nine because “the 
United States ha[d] not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts 
under the FTCA.”39  In addressing the plaintiff’s ATS claims, the court found 
the statutory language of the ATS40 and the language of the treaties “form the 
                                                          
see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (explaining when “an excessive force claim arises 
in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop . . . it is most properly characterized as one invoking 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees . . . the right ‘to be secure in their per-
sons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person”).  
 31.  Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 256.  
 32.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  The ATS grants United States district courts “original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”  Id. 
 33.  Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 255 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
 34.  Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837, 838–39 (W.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), 
vacated sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017); see id. at 389 (setting out the Gov-
ernment’s argument).  
 35.  Id. at 837.   
 36.  Id. at 841 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(k) (West 2011)).  The central focus of the inquiry is 
on the location in which the injury was suffered, not the location in which the tortious act occurred.  
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (holding that “the FTCA’s foreign country 
exception bars all claims based on an injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the 
tortious act or omission occurred”). 
 37.  Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 844. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. (citing Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 569 n.7 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
 40.  See supra note 32 (providing the exact language of the ATS).   
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substantive basis” for the claim but did not contain an “unequivocally ex-
pressed” waiver of sovereign immunity.41  Consequently, the court dismissed 
Claim Eleven.42 
Following the United States’ successful motion, Agent Mesa moved to 
dismiss the Bivens claim against him based on qualified immunity.43  Quali-
fied immunity shields an officer from liability unless the officer violated a 
constitutional right that was “clearly established at the time of the [officer’s] 
alleged misconduct.”44  In granting the motion, the court reasoned no clearly 
established constitutional right existed because Hernández did not have the 
sufficient voluntary connections to the United States required under United 
States v. Verdugo–Uquidez45 to invoke Fourth Amendment protections.46  
Furthermore, the court explained Graham v. Connor47 negated the Fifth 
Amendment claim because it held, “[E]xcessive force claims should be ana-
lyzed only under the Fourth Amendment.”48  Similarly, Agent Mesa’s super-
visors moved to dismiss all claims brought against them.49  The district court 
granted the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff’s “failed to show ‘the Defend-
ants were personally involved in the June 7 incident’ or there was a causal 
link ‘between the Defendants’ acts or omissions and a violation of Hernán-
dez’s rights.”50 
B.  Review by The Fifth Circuit 
The plaintiffs appealed the adverse judgments to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.51  In its initial opinion, the Fifth Circuit af-
                                                          
 41.  Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 845.  For liability to “be imposed upon the United States,” 
Congress must have (1) “unequivocally expressed in statutory text” the intent to waive sovereign 
immunity, and “(2) there must be a source of substantive law that provides a claim for relief.”  Id. 
at 840 (first quoting In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. 468 F.3d 248, 260 (5th Cir. 2006) (Dennis, 
J., concurring); then quoting Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334–35 (5th Cir. 2009); and 
then quoting In re Supreme Beef Processors, 468 F.3d at 260)).   
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 
117 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 44.  Id. at 260 (quoting Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
 45.  494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 46.  Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 256. 
 47.  490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 48.  Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 256. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 257. 
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firmed the judgment in favor of the United States and Agent Mesa’s supervi-
sors.52  Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion regard-
ing the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment53 but ultimately reversed the 
judgment in favor of Agent Mesa on Fifth Amendment grounds.54  The court 
held that the appellants,55 by defeating qualified immunity, alleged a viable 
Fifth Amendment Bivens action against Agent  Mesa.56 
The Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc to consider whether Agent 
Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and, necessarily, whether Hernán-
dez was protected by the Fifth Amendment.57  The en banc court unanimously 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claim.58  The court reasoned the 
Fifth Amendment right against excessive force claimed by the appellants on 
behalf of Hernández was not a “clearly established” right “at the time of [the] 
alleged misconduct,” which is a necessary prong in the qualified immunity 
analysis.59  Specifically, the case law at the time of the shooting did not “rea-
sonably warn[] Agent Mesa”60 that a non-citizen, with no significant volun-
tary connections to the United States standing on foreign soil, was protected 
against the use of excessive force by a United States official standing within 
United States territory.61  The en banc court, therefore, successfully escaped 
the constitutional question—that is, the applicability of the Fifth Amendment 
to Hernández—in accordance with “the general rule of constitutional avoid-
ance.”62 
                                                          
 52.  Id. at 280. 
 53.  Id. at 267. 
 54.  Id. at 280. 
 55.  In the discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s holding, Jesus C. Hernández and Maria Guadalupe 
Guereca Bentacour, the victim’s parents and the plaintiffs below, will now be collectively referred 
to as “the appellants.”  
 56. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 280. 
 57.  Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119–20 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), vacated sub 
nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).  The en banc court agreed with the panel court’s 
decision to affirm “the dismissal of . . . claims against the United States and against Agent Mesa’s 
supervisors.”  Id. at 119 (citation omitted) (citing Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 257–59, 280).  Addition-
ally, the court concurred in the panel court’s holding that “Hernández, a Mexican citizen who had 
no ‘significant voluntary connection’ to the United States, and who was on Mexican soil at the time 
he was shot, cannot assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)).  Therefore, the en banc court only 
considered the issue of qualified immunity and, accordingly, the application of the Fifth Amend-
ment to Hernández.  Id. at 119–20. 
 58.  Id. at 119. 
 59.  Id. at 120, 121 (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 
(2009)).  
 60.  Under this analysis, “a right is clearly established only where ‘it would be clear to a rea-
sonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’”  Id. at 120 (quoting 
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)).  
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id. at 121 (quoting Callahan, 555 U.S. at 241); see Constitutional-Avoidance Rule, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the rule of constitutional avoidance as “[t]he 
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On July 23, 2015, the appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of the 
United States to review the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision, and the Court 
granted certiorari.63  Three questions were presented for review: (1) whether 
the appellants can assert a Bivens claim for damages; (2) whether Hernán-
dez’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Agent Mesa fatally shot 
him; and (3) whether qualified immunity can protect Agent Mesa from the 
appellant’s claim that Hernández’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated 
when Agent Mesa fatally shot him.64 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The debate surrounding the extraterritorial application of the Constitu-
tion has deep historical roots.65  Traditionally, the Supreme Court maintained 
a strictly formalist approach,66 halting constitutional protections at the bor-
der.67  As time progressed, however, the Court became more favorable to 
functionalist considerations but has yet to overrule its formalist precedent.68  
The law is accordingly in a variable state, leaving lower courts free to choose 
their own route when considering the extraterritoriality of constitutional priv-
ileges.  The following sections will elaborate on the history of this judicial 
trend by (1) discussing the Court’s early attempts at drawing this line,69 (2) 
highlighting the major points of transition in the extraterritorial doctrine,70 
and (3) summarizing the modern interpretation.71  Subsequent to this discus-
sion, this Part will provide a brief introduction to the historical foundations 
of the Fourth Amendment.72 
                                                          
doctrine that a case should not be resolved by deciding a constitutional question if it can be resolved 
in some other fashion”).  
 63.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Her-
nandez, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (No. 15-118), 2015 WL 4537883. 
 64.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2004–05. 
 65.  See generally In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (discussing, for the first time, the extrater-
ritorial reach of the Constitution). 
 66.  See Formalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining formalism as 
“[d]ecision-making on the basis of form rather than substance; . . . an interpretive method whereby 
the judge adheres to the words rather than pursuing the text’s unexpressed purposes . . . or evaluat-
ing its consequences”). 
 67.  See infra Section II.A. 
 68.  See infra Section II.B–C; Functionalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (de-
fining functionalism as “[a] methodological approach to law focusing on the effects of rules in prac-
tice . . . rather than on the precise statements of the rules themselves”). 
 69.  See infra Section II.A. 
 70.  See infra Section II.B. 
 71.  See infra Section II.C. 
 72.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see infra Section II.D. 
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A.  Early Developments: Defining the Limits of Constitutional 
Protection 
In 1891, the Court first considered the reach of the Constitution abroad 
in In re Ross.73  John M. Ross, a Canadian crew-member on an American 
ship anchored in a Japanese harbor, was sentenced to death by the American 
Consular Tribunal in Japan for the murder of a fellow seaman.74  In seeking 
a writ of habeas corpus, Ross argued his presence on an American ship and 
trial by an American tribunal should have entitled him to the “same protection 
and guarantee against an undue accusation or an unfair trial, secured by the 
Constitution.”75  The Court held the rights Ross sought, such as the right to 
an impartial trial by jury and to an indictment by a grand jury, were only 
available to United States citizens and those within the nation’s borders, “not 
to residents or temporary sojourners abroad.”76  Accordingly, persons upon 
an American vessel were not entitled to the protections of the Constitution 
until they entered United States territory.77  Ultimately, the Court adopted a 
strictly formalist approach and concluded the Constitution has no effect out-
side the bounds of the United States.78 
From 1901 to 1922, the Court considered whether the Constitution ex-
tended to United States territories in a series of cases known collectively as 
the Insular Cases.79  Through these decisions, the Court developed the doc-
trine of territorial incorporation,80 which provides that the Constitution ap-
plies with full force in territories that Congress intended to “incorporate” as 
part of the United States.81  The Court’s decisions were also motivated by the 
                                                          
 73.  140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
 74.  Id. at 454.  President Hayes pardoned Ross on the condition that he receive a life sentence 
of hard labor.  Id. at 455. 
 75.  Id. at 463.  
 76.  Id. at 464 (citing Cook v United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181 (1891)). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); 
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); 
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); 
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 
176 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904); 
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Men-
dezona v. United States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); 
Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Kent 
v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907); New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909); 
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139 (1913); Ocampo 
v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
 80.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008) (explaining the doctrine of territorial 
incorporation).  
 81.  Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305–06.  The territories included in this doctrine were also classified 
as “[t]erritories surely destined for statehood.”  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757. 
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practical obstacles involved in extending the Constitution outside the conti-
nental United States, recognizing constitutional provisions “are not always 
and everywhere applicable” and demonstrating an initial interest in function-
alist thinking.82 
The Court was silent on the issue of extraterritoriality until 1950 when 
it heard Johnson v. Eisentrager.83  In Johnson, twenty-one German nationals 
petitioned for writs of habeas corpus after being tried and convicted for war 
crimes by a United States military commission in China.84  The prisoners 
claimed their trial by military commission and subsequent convictions vio-
lated Article I, Article III, and the Fifth Amendment.85  The Court held the 
Constitution does not protect alien prisoners tried and detained abroad.86  In 
recognizing constitutional protections extend to resident aliens, the Court ex-
plained, “[I]t was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that 
gave the Judiciary power to act.”87  Accordingly, the prisoners in this case 
had no grounds to base their constitutional claim since they “at no relevant 
time were within any territory over which the United States [was] sover-
eign.”88  In addition, similar to the Insular Cases, the Court exhibited  recep-
tiveness to functionalism when it considered several practical complications 
inherent in extending the right of the writ to the prisoners abroad.89 
In his dissent, Justice Black focused his analysis on the functionalist 
approach to extraterritoriality.90  He cautioned that the majority’s territorial 
approach was “a broad and dangerous principle” as it “inescapably denie[d] 
courts power to afford the least bit of protection for any alien who is subject 
to our occupation government abroad.”91  Justice Black continued to consider 
a number of functional factors to explain why the Constitution, and specifi-
cally habeas corpus review, should have extended to “[the] petitioners and 
                                                          
 82.  Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312.  
 83.  339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 84.  Id. at 765–66.  Specifically, the prisoners were “collecting and furnishing intelligence con-
cerning American forces and their movements to the Japanese armed forces” and, thereby, were 
found guilty of “engaging in, permitting or ordering continued military activity against the United 
States after surrender of Germany and before surrender of Japan.”  Id. at 766. 
 85.  Id. at 767.  While not relevant to this discussion, the prisoners also claimed that their trial, 
conviction, and subsequent imprisonment violated “provisions of the Geneva Convention governing 
treatment of prisoners of war.”  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 785. 
 87.  Id. at 771.  
 88.  Id. at 778. 
 89.  Id. at 779; see, e.g., id. (explaining that the practical complications would include the costs 
of transportation of petitioners and witnesses, the implication that this would make the writ available 
to enemies in times of war, which would “hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the 
enemy,” and the lack of potential reciprocity). 
 90.  Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).  
 91.  Id. at 795–96. 
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others like them.”92  Justice Black concluded, “Our nation proclaims a belief 
in the dignity of human beings as such, no matter what their nationality or 
where they happen to live.”93  Moving into the late 1950s, the question of 
extraterritoriality hinged on the geographic location of those wishing to in-
voke constitutional protections. 
B.  The Transition: The Constitution Moves Overseas 
In 1957, the Court decided Reid v. Covert,94 a case involving two mili-
tary wives who were tried in a United States military court overseas for mur-
dering their husbands.95  Both women sought a writ of habeas corpus “on the 
ground that the Constitution forbade [the] trial [of civilians abroad] by mili-
tary authorities.”96  The Court agreed, holding, on the basis of Section 2 of 
Article III, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment, that their trial 
was unconstitutional.97  The Court reasoned, when the United States govern-
ment “reache[d] out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the 
Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide . . . should not be 
stripped away just because he happen[ed] to be in another land.”98  Constitu-
tional protections, the Court said, not only extend to citizens abroad, but the 
constitutional restraints placed upon government actors similarly follow 
those officials as they perform their duties outside the territory of the United 
States.99  With this holding, the Court effectively overruled In re Ross and 
moved even further away from the strict formalism it adopted.100 
Notably, Justice Harlan’s concurrence exemplifies the modern function-
alist approach.  He argued, “[T]here is no rigid and abstract rule.”101  Instead, 
when considering the extraterritoriality of the Constitution, the question 
should be “which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in view of the 
                                                          
 92.  Id. at 797; see, e.g., id. at 797–98 (considering the control the United States has over that 
occupied area of Germany, that United States laws were applied, the unlikelihood that these prison-
ers would receive relief elsewhere, and the general constitutional principle that “all people, whether 
our citizens or not . . . have an equal chance before the bar of criminal justice”). 
 93.  Id. at 798. 
 94.  354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 95.  Id. at 3–4. 
 96.  Id. at 4. 
 97.  Id. at 5, 7–8.  
 98.  Id. at 6. 
 99.  Id. at 7. 
 100.  Id. at 12.  The Court explained, “The Ross approach that the Constitution has no applica-
bility abroad has long since been directly repudiated by numerous cases” and “should be left as a 
relic from a different era.”  Id.   
 101.  Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
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particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alterna-
tives.”102  The Court, Justice Harlan explained, should be free to use its judg-
ment, as opposed to strict adherence to a set rule, to avoid “impracticable and 
anomalous” results.103  Accordingly, as of 1957, the Constitution followed 
both United States citizens and officials abroad, providing all the same pro-
tections and restrictions as it would if they were standing within United States 
territory.104 
C.  The Modern Approach: Functionalism or Formalism? 
The case law surrounding the extraterritoriality of the Constitution re-
mained undisturbed until 1990, when the Court decided United States v. Ver-
dugo–Urquidez.105  Rene Martin Verdugo–Urquidez, a Mexican citizen ar-
rested and convicted for his leadership role in “a large and violent 
organization in Mexico that smuggles narcotics into the United States,” 
moved to dismiss his case on the basis that the warrantless search of his home 
in Mexico by United States agents violated the Fourth Amendment.106  The 
Court disagreed,107 reasoning the protections against arbitrary government 
embedded in the Fourth Amendment extended only to “the people” of the 
United States and were not “intended to restrain the actions of the Federal 
Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.”108  Looking 
to precedent, the Court concluded, “[A]liens receive constitutional protec-
tions when they have come within the territory of the United States and de-
veloped substantial [voluntary] connections with this country.”109  The Court 
ultimately held Verdugo–Urquidez did not meet this requirement.110  The 
Court emphasized its formalist approach by concluding strict limits to con-
stitutional application at the border are necessary to ensure the nation’s abil-
ity to “functio[n] effectively in the company of sovereign nations.”111 
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy objected to the majority’s reliance 
on the language of the Fourth Amendment to determine its scope,112 but he 
                                                          
 102.  Id. at 75 (emphasis omitted). 
 103.  Id. at 74.  
 104.  See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.  
 105.  494 U.S. 259 (1990).  
 106.  Id. at 262–63.  
 107.  Id. at 275. 
 108.  Id. at 266 (emphasis added).  
 109.  Id. at 271. 
 110.  Id. at 271–72.  The Court explained that Verdugo–Urquidez’s presence within the United 
States was involuntary, as he was forcibly brought into the country by United States officials, and 
he had been present in the country for only a few days.  Id.  
 111.  Id. at 275 (quoting Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)).  
 112.  Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy explains, “The force of the Consti-
tution is not confined because it was brought into being by certain persons who gave their immediate 
assent to its terms.”  Id. 
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agreed with the Court’s holding because “[t]he conditions and considerations 
of this case would make adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement impracticable and anomalous.”113  Justice Brennan, however, in 
his dissent, argued the majority “create[d] an antilogy,” as the Constitution 
permits “our Government [officials] to enforce our criminal laws abroad” 
but, per the Court’s holding, did not require the Fourth Amendment to “travel 
with them.”114  The United States considers itself to be “the world’s foremost 
protector of liberties,” Justice Brennan proclaimed, but he continued to ask, 
“How can we explain to others—and to ourselves—that these long cherished 
ideals are suddenly of no consequence when the door being broken belongs 
to a foreigner?”115 
In Boumediene v. Bush,116 the Court’s most recent decision on extrater-
ritoriality, the Court held, by applying the functionalist approach, aliens de-
tained at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to the constitutional right of habeas 
corpus.117  The Court explained, there is a “common thread” between its prec-
edent cases118—“the idea that questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective 
factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”119  The Court identified three 
relevant factors to consider: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and 
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was 
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took 
place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s en-
titlement to the writ.”120  After considering each factor, the Court concluded 
the detainees were “entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the 
legality of their detention.”121  Evidently, this decision declined to follow the 
formalist precedent and relied primarily on functionalist thinking.122  The 
Court, however, did not explicitly overrule the formalist approach used in its 
prior precedent.123  Moving forward, the Court left open two routes to the 
extraterritorial analysis based on opposing theories of legal interpretation. 
                                                          
 113.  Id. at 276, 278. 
 114.  Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 115.  Id. at 285–86.  
 116.  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 117.  Id. at 732. 
 118.  Id. at 764 (citing the Insular Cases, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), and Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).  
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 766. 
 121.  Id. at 771. The Court based its decision on (1) the inadequacy of the review process to 
determine the status of the detainees/enemy combatants, (2) the United States’ “[non-]transient” and 
complete control over Guantanamo Bay, and (3) the minimal burdens, balanced with the United 
States’ inability to provide evidence to the contrary, involved in extending the writ in these circum-
stances.  Id. at 766–71.  
 122.  See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
 123.  See Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 265, 266 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining how 
the court is “bound to apply the sufficient connections requirement of Verdugo–Urquidez . . . in 
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D.  The Fourth Amendment: Overview of the Historical Foundations 
To provide context to the forthcoming analysis, this Section will briefly 
summarize the historical basis of the Fourth Amendment through a discus-
sion of one of the Court’s early founding precedents, Boyd v. United States.124  
In Boyd, the United States seized thirty-five cases of imported plated glass 
from Boyd & Sons on the grounds that the owners had committed fraud in 
violation of an 1874 customs revenue law.125  As provided by the statute, the 
company was ordered to furnish the invoice for the seized cases to establish 
the basis for the charge.126  The company complied but objected to the use of 
the invoice as evidence, claiming, “[T]he statute, so far as it compel[ed] pro-
duction of evidence to be used against [the company] [was] unconstitutional 
and void” based on the Fourth Amendment.127  After recognizing this case 
presented “a very grave question of constitutional law, involving the personal 
security, and privileges and immunities of the citizen,”128 the Court found, 
“[A] compulsory production of a man’s private papers to establish a criminal 
charge against him . . . is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment . . . be-
cause it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of 
search and seizure.”129  The Court held the notice requiring Boyd & Sons to 
produce the invoice and the law that legitimized it was in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.130 
To support its conclusion, the Court relied on the historical foundations 
of the Fourth Amendment.131  The Court summarized the rejection of the 
early English writs of assistance132 and general warrants133 as an abuse of 
                                                          
light of Boumediene’s general functional approach” because the court “cannot ignore a decision 
from the Supreme Court unless directed to do so by the Court itself”), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 117 
(5th Cir. 2015). 
 124.  116 U.S. 616 (1886).  
 125.  Id. at 617.  
 126.  Id. at 618.  
 127.  Id. at 618, 621.  In addition to the Fourth Amendment, Boyd & Sons also based their claim 
on the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 621.  While intertwined with the Court’s analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment argument will not be discussed.  
 128.  Id. at 618.  
 129.  Id. at 622.  
 130.  Id. at 638.  
 131.  Id. at 624–25. 
 132.  Writs of assistance were issued to “revenue officers” and allowed them to “search sus-
pected places for smuggled goods.”  Id. at 625. 
 133.  General warrants were issued by the Secretary of State and allowed officials to search one’s 
home for the “discovery and seizure of books and papers that might be used to convict their owner 
of the charge of libel.”  Id. at 625–26. 
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arbitrary power and hindrance to liberty by the Crown that fueled this na-
tion’s movement toward independence.134  The Court contended it was with 
this backdrop—“[t]he struggles against arbitrary power . . . [that were] too 
deeply engraved in their memories”—that the Framers crafted the Fourth 
Amendment.135  In accordance with this historical framework, the Court fur-
ther noted, the “essence” of a Fourth Amendment violation revolved less 
around “the breaking of [one’s] doors, and the rummaging of [one’s] draw-
ers,” but instead focused on “the invasion of [one’s] indefeasible right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty.”136  The Framers, accordingly, “never would 
have approved . . . such insidious disguises of the old grievance which they 
had so deeply abhorred.”137 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s ruling 
and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration.138  
The Court first addressed whether the appellants may assert a Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics139 claim for dam-
ages and held it would be more “appropriate” for the Court of Appeals to 
reconsider the issue in light of the Court’s recent decision in Ziglar v. Ab-
basi.140  In Abbasi, the Court “clarified what constitutes a ‘special factor 
counseling hesitation,’” which is a necessary consideration when deciding 
whether to extend a Bivens remedy to a situation beyond the pre-established 
types of factual circumstances that provide the basis for a cause of action.141  
Specifically, under Abbasi, the special factors analysis focuses on the Judici-
                                                          
 134.  Id. at 625; see id. at 626–30 (praising Lord Camden’s opinion in Entick v. Carrington 
(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) (20.3.1), as “the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law” 
that informed the Framers as they drafted the Fourth Amendment). 
 135.  Id. at 630. 
 136.  Id.  
 137.  Id.  
 138.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2008 (2017).  On remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the ruling of the district court, holding there are special factors counseling hesitation against extend-
ing a Bivens remedy in this new context.  Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 12-50217, slip op. at 18–19 (5th 
Cir. Mar. 20, 2018).  The court reasoned, “extending Bivens would interfere with the political 
branches’ oversight of national security and foreign affairs[,] . . . flout Congress’s consistent and 
explicit refusal to provide damages remedies for aliens injured abroad[,] [a]nd . . . create a remedy 
with uncertain limits.”  Id. at 18.  The court furthered noted, “The myriad implications of an extra-
territorial Bivens remedy require this court to deny it.”  Id. at 19.  
 139.  403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 140.  137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006–07. 
 141.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006 (alteration omitted).  Bivens does not apply when “there are 
‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’”  Id. (quot-
ing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)). 
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ary’s ability, “absent congressional action or instruction,” to assess the con-
sequences of moving forward with a new category of action for damages.142  
In support of its decision to remand the issue, the Court ended this analysis 
by recognizing its role as a reviewing court, not a court of first impression.143 
Next, the Court addressed the Fourth Amendment issue within the con-
text of the Bivens claim.144  The Court held, “It would be imprudent for this 
Court to resolve that issue” considering the “intervening guidance provided 
in Abbasi,” which may ultimately eliminate the Fourth Amendment issue as 
the presence of special factors counseling hesitation may prevent a Bivens 
remedy from emerging within the context of the instant case.145  In support 
of avoiding the constitutional question, the Court further reasoned, without 
enumerating specific examples, that the Fourth Amendment inquiry is “sen-
sitive and may have consequences that are far reaching.”146 
Finally, considering the Fifth Amendment147 claim, the Court held, “The 
en banc Court of Appeals . . . erred in granting qualified immunity” because 
the court relied on facts that were unknown to Agent Mesa at the time of the 
shooting.148  Specifically, Agent Mesa did not know Hernández was a Mexi-
can citizen with no significant voluntary connection to the United States 
when he shot him.149  In the context of determining whether a right is clearly 
established,150 the Court explained the inquiry “is limited to ‘the facts that 
were knowable to the defendant officers’ at the time they engaged in the con-
duct in question.”151  The Court, accordingly, concluded, “Facts an officer 
learns after the incident . . . are not relevant” in determining whether quali-
fied immunity should be granted or denied.152  The Court remanded the case 
to the Fifth Circuit to reconsider the issue.153 
                                                          
 142.  Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858). 
 143.  Id. at 2007 (quoting Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 
(2017)).  
 144.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.  
 145.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.  If special factors counseling hesitation, in light of the 
Court’s clarification in Abbasi, prevent a Bivens remedy in the situation presented here, no need  
exists to consider the constitutional element of the Bivens action (i.e., the Fourth Amendment ques-
tion) because the entire Bivens claim will have deteriorated.  Id. 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 148.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007. 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  See supra notes 44, 62 and accompanying text.  
 151.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per 
curiam)).  
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id. at 2006.  
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Justice Breyer, in his dissent, wrote on the Fourth Amendment issue the 
majority failed to address.154  Specifically, Justice Breyer would have re-
versed the lower court’s judgment that Hernández lacked significant volun-
tary connections to the United States to invoke Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.155  Accordingly, under Justice Breyer’s approach, “reversal would 
ordinarily bring with it the right” to allege a Bivens claim for damages.156  
Justice Breyer explained, the Court’s “precedents make clear that ‘questions 
of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not for-
malism’” or de jure sovereignty.157  Justice Breyer proceeded to list six fac-
tors and concerns which “convince[d] [him] that Hernández was protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.”158 
First, Agent Mesa was a federal officer who did not know the citizenship 
of the boy he was targeting nor whether the bullet would land on the Mexican 
or United States side of the border.159  Second, the culvert, where the shooting 
took place, “has special border-related physical features” as “fences and bor-
der crossing posts are not in the culvert itself [where the borderline actually 
resides] but lie on either side.”160  Third, the culvert has historically been the 
nontechnical border, as it was built to relocate the Rio Grande River—the 
original border between Mexico and the United States.161  Fourth, the culvert 
was constructed and is now managed by a “jointly organized international 
boundary commission” that contains “representatives of both nations.”162  
Fifth, the culvert, as a “limitrophe” area,163 imposes “special obligation[s] of 
co-operation and good neighborliness” upon bordering nations as prescribed 
by international law.164  Sixth, if the Fourth Amendment is not extended to 
the culvert, “serious anomalies” will result.165 Justice Breyer expounded: 
                                                          
 154.  Id. at 2008 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 2008–09 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008)).  De jure sover-
eignty refers to sovereignty that “[e]xist[s] by right or according to law.”  De jure, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 158.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2009 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id. at 2009–10. 
 163.  Id.  Limitrophe describes “a special border-related area” that “consist[s] of an engineer’s 
‘imaginary line’” as opposed to a traditional border created by “rivers, mountain ranges, and other 
[physical] areas.”  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 2010; see, e.g., id. at 2009–10 (discussing the joint responsibilities of the limitrophe 
as proscribed by the Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande 
and Colorado River as the International Boundary, Mex.-U.S., art. II-IV, Nov. 23, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 
371). 
 165.  Id. at 2010. 
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The Court of Appeals’ approach create[d] a protective difference 
depending upon whether Hernández had been hit just before or just 
after he crossed an imaginary mathematical borderline running 
through the culvert’s middle.  But nothing else would have 
changed . . . [g]iven the near irrelevance of that midculvert line (as 
compared with the rest of the culvert) for most border-related pur-
poses, as well as almost any other purpose, that result would seem 
anomalous.166 
A consideration of these factors as a whole, Justice Breyer concluded, 
establishes sufficient support for extending Fourth Amendment protections 
to the entire culvert.167  Accordingly, Justice Breyer would have addressed 
the Fourth Amendment question and remanded the Bivens and qualified im-
munity issues.168 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This Part will begin by introducing the context in which Hernández lost 
his life, explaining how Border Patrol agents operate under conditions that 
encourage the use of excessive force.169  Next, this Part will argue the Court 
should have allowed a civil remedy—an immediate form of deterrence to 
curb the future use of excessive force—by holding the Fourth Amendment 
can apply in this case through the Boumediene v. Bush170 objective factors 
analysis, which this Part will argue fundamentally overrules the significant 
voluntary connections test established in United States v. Verdugo–Ur-
quidez.171  Lastly, this Part will contend providing a remedy is consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment’s historical objectives.172 
A.  Contributing Circumstances 
The combination of internal obstacles with the lack of external account-
ability has created conditions that breed excessive force incidents,173 like the 
                                                          
 166.  Id.  Justice Breyer added, “[T]he anomalies would multiply” as there are “[n]umerous 
bridges span[ning] the culvert” that are used daily by Mexicans and Americans.  Id.  Therefore, he 
concluded, it does not seem practical or logical “to distinguish for Fourth Amendment purposes 
among these many thousands of individuals on the basis of an invisible line of which none of them 
is aware.”  Id. at 2011.  
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 170.  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 171.  494 U.S. 259 (1990); see infra Section IV.B. 
 172.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 173.  From January 2010 to May 2016, out of the fifty-three deaths caused by Border Patrol 
agents, forty-eight were attributed to the “use of force or coercion.”  AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF 
N.M., DEATHS AND INJURIES IN CBP ENCOUNTERS SINCE JANUARY 2010, at 24 (2016), 
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one in the present case, and foster minimal mechanisms of deterrence.174  Ac-
cess to a civil remedy could provide an incentive for Border Patrol agents to 
limit their abusive use of force and ensure the 500,000 individuals that cross 
the border daily,175 those most vulnerable to such mistreatment, have access 
to potential recourse if so subjected.  This Section will summarize the internal 
and external factors contributing to the present state of Border Patrol. 
There are a number of significant internal factors, when combined, that 
provide the basis for excessive use of force by Border Patrol agents.  First, 
the Agency has become increasingly militarized despite being a civilian 
force.176  Many agents are recent veterans who served in Afghanistan and 
Iraq,177 and there have been upgrades to military quality surveillance and de-
fense equipment.178 Relatedly, agents “consider themselves the country’s 
first line of defense, . . . vowing to ‘never surrender a foot of U.S. soil.’”179  
This mentality is reinforced by the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”).  The DHS explicitly instructs agents to “fight back” against crimi-
nal organizations that operate around the border, which implicitly encourages 
the mentality that everyone near the border is a “bad guy” and mirrors the 
state of mind held by soldiers on the battlefield where deadly force is a means 
of survival.180  Furthermore, Border Patrol agents are also granted signifi-
cantly greater powers than traditional law enforcement officers.181  For ex-
ample, agents may conduct searches without reasonable suspicion, probable 
                                                          
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/may_2016_dead_and_injured_by_cbp_of-
ficials.pdf. 
 174.  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency in 
Support of Petitioners at 3, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118) [hereinafter 
Brief by Former Officials of CBP]. 
 175.  Brief of Amici Curiae Border Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 4, Hernandez v. Mesa, 
137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118) [hereinafter Brief by Border Scholars] (citing TransBorder 
Freight Data, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transbor-
der/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2018)). 
 176.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 3.  
 177.  Id. at 6 (noting “more than one-third of Border Patrol agents are former military person-
nel”).  While not inherently negative, the high number of former service men and women, nonethe-
less, contributes to the militarized environment of Border Patrol.  Id at 5–6.  
 178.  Id.  Examples include Blackhawk helicopters, fixed-winged jets, and predator drones.  Id. 
(citing Todd Miller, War on the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/08/18/opinion/sunday/war-on-the-border.html).   
 179.  Id. at 7 (quoting Mark Binelli, 10 Shots Across the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/magazine/10-shots-across-the-border.html).  
 180.  Id.  It is noteworthy to acknowledge that many policymakers are in support of a stronger 
force at the border.  See, e.g., Press Release, More Praises for President Trump’s Commitment to 
Border Security, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 23 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state-
ments/praise-president-trumps-commitment-border-security/ (summarizing a number of favorable 
responses to increased border security).  The author, however, does not intend to argue a particular 
policy stance on border security but only attempts to illustrate the current trends that have contrib-
uted to excessive force incidents.  
 181.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 5–6. 
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cause, or a warrant if the target of their search is within 100 feet of the bor-
der.182 
Second, training on appropriate use of force for Border Patrol agents is 
lacking, which is demonstrated by the numerous reports filed claiming ex-
cessive use of force and by the multitude of deaths caused by Border Patrol 
agents.183  This is likely the result of the low supervision rates of trainees due 
to insufficient funds caused by the “hiring surge.”184  Specifically, an audit 
of the use of force training programs revealed, at one location, “many agents 
and officers do not understand use of force and the extent to which they may 
or may not use force.”185  The most frequent example of lack of training arises 
in incidents involving rock throwing.186  Rock throwing, a common occur-
rence at the border, is considered to be a lethal threat and agents have devel-
oped an “unofficial” policy of responding with the use of deadly force “in-
stead of taking cover or calling for backup.”187 Agents routinely remained in 
reach of the rock throwers despite the fact that “moving out of range was a 
reasonable option.”188 
Third, pre-employment screening measures are deficient, which is sim-
ilarly a likely result of limited resources combined with the “rapid” increase 
of new hires.189  From 2006 to 2009, only 10 to 15 percent of new agents 
                                                          
 182.  Id. at 6–7 (citing Lori Johnson, Preserving the Excessive Force Doctrine at Our Nation’s 
Borders, 14 HOLY CROSS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 90 (2010)).  
 183.  From 2007 to 2012, there have been 1187 reports of use of excessive force by agents.  Id. 
at 18 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., CBP USE OF FORCE 
TRAINING AND ACTIONS TO ADDRESS USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS 6–7 (Sept. 2013) (redacted), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-114_Sep13.pdf); see supra note 173. 
 184.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 12, 15 (explaining “resource con-
straints” left CPB “unable to match [the] hiring surge with adequate . . . training programs” and the 
agent-to-supervisor ration range from 7-1 and up to 11-1).  The lack of funds for agent training can 
be further demonstrated through current fund allocation trends.  Based solely on an assessment of 
CBP’s current funding priorities, the 2019 budget report allocates over three times the amount of 
funding to wall construction, infrastructure development, and equipment upgrades than to training 
initiatives.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 2–3 (2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf. 
 185.  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 183, at 17. 
 186.  For ten out of the twenty-four incidents of fatal shootings from 2010 to 2014, rock throwing 
was given as justification for the use of force.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, 
at 9 (citing Brian Bennett, Border Patrol Sees Little Reform on Agents’ Use of Force, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://beta.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-abuse-20150223-story.html).  
 187.  Id. Furthermore, agents have used lethal force even when inside their vehicles despite Bor-
der Patrol’s policy to use lethal force only when reasonably necessary.  Id. at 10. 
 188.  POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, USE OF 
FORCE REVIEW: CASES AND POLICIES 6 (2013), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/PERFReport.pdf. 
 189.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 12, 14. 
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received pre-employment polygraphs despite the “border region [being] con-
sidered the ‘highest threat environment for government corruption.’”190  The 
results of the administered polygraphs indicated “60 percent [of applicants] 
were determined unsuitable for service . . . because they admitted . . . to prior 
criminal activity, including violent crimes and involvement with drug cartels 
and smugglers.”191  Despite these results, Customs and Border Patrol 
(“CBP”) did not require pre-employment polygraph examinations for all ap-
plicants until 2012.192  In fact, cartel members have been hired, there have 
been instances of infiltration, and current agents have been arrested for seri-
ous crimes (e.g., smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy) and other 
lesser offences (e.g., drunk driving, domestic violence, and assault).193 
Lastly, Border Patrol agents practice a “culture of protectionism” that 
hinders internal investigations of claims involving excessive force.194  Agents 
have developed a “code of silence”—an understanding between agents that 
nothing is to be said that may incriminate another agent, even if they have 
clearly violated the law.195  Their motto is: “What happens in the field stays 
in the field.”196 
These internal hurdles that have contributed to unregulated action are 
heightened when combined with the external obstacles limiting accountabil-
ity.  First, the United States has never extradited an agent to Mexico to be 
prosecuted for the use of lethal force on a Mexican citizen.197  The United 
States has no obligation to extradite its own citizens under the relevant 
treaty,198 and it is highly unlikely it would do so voluntarily.199  Second, only 
one agent has ever been charged in the United States for a cross-border shoot-
ing.200  The obstacles facing internal investigation and the preference against 
                                                          
 190.  Id. at 13 (quoting Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became 
America’s Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement Agency, POLITICO MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2014, 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-112220).  
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id. at 14.  
 193.  Id. at 16–18; see, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Hired by Customs, but Working for Mexican 
Cartels, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/us/18corrupt.html 
(providing instances where CBP employees facilitated smuggling activity).   
 194.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 4.  
 195.  Id. at 21.  
 196.  Id. (quoting Graff, supra note 190).  
 197.  Id. at 29.  
 198.  Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, 
Mex.-U.S, art. 9, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059 (“Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver 
up its own nationals, but the executive authority . . . shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party, 
have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.”). 
 199.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 29. 
 200.  Id. at 4.  The victim, José Antonio Elena Rodriguez, was shot ten times in the back while 
walking home along the Mexican side of the border fence.  Taylor Dolven, Over the Line, VICE 
NEWS (June 9, 2017), https://news.vice.com/story/what-happens-when-u-s-border-patrol-kills-in-
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prosecution make it highly unlikely this will become a trend.  In addition, 
from 2009 to 2012, ninety-seven percent of complaints reporting abuse by 
agents resulted in “No Action Taken.”201 
The present conditions illustrate the need for an immediate means of 
accountability, redress, and deterrence.202  The need for a judicial remedy203 
becomes amplified when considering the vast number of people subjected to 
the authority of Border Patrol.204  The border area where the shooting in the 
instant case occurred runs though Paso del Norte, which is “a single metro-
politan” consisting of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mex-
ico.205  Five hundred thousand Mexicans and Americans cross every day for 
work, school, family, shopping, doctor visits, and other regular activities.206  
These binational characteristics are not limited to the community surrounding 
Paso del Norte but instead are commonly shared by the communities that run 
up and down the southwestern border, which have also had their share of 
cross-border shootings resembling the facts surrounding the death of Hernán-
dez (i.e., a non-threatening encounter where the agents claimed rocks were 
being thrown).207  Accordingly, the Court’s decision to avoid providing an 
                                                          
mexico.  The trial was set to be heard on October 24, 2017.  Judge Delays Trial of Border Patrol 
Agent in Fatal Shooting, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ar-
izona/articles/2017-08-11/judge-delays-trial-of-border-patrol-agent-in-fatal-shooting.  The trial, 
however, was delayed to March 2018.  Rafael Carranza, Family of Teen Killed by Border Patrol 
Agent Denounces Trial Delays, AZCENTRAL (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.azcen-
tral.com/story/news/politics/border-issues/2017/10/11/family-jose-antonio-elena-rodriguez-killed-
border-patrol-agent-lonnie-swartz-decries-trial-delays/748092001/. 
 201.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 28. 
 202.  While recognizing the argument in favor of leaving the means and method of accountabil-
ity, redress, and deterrence in the hands of Congress, the Court has taken the position “that individ-
uals need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.”  Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (“The Nation’s courts are open to injured individuals who come to 
them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter.  An individual can invoke a 
right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and 
even if the legislature refuses to act.”).  On remand, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the only possible 
grounds for recovery stem from a judicial remedy created under Bivens.  Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 
12-50217, slip op. at 4 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018) (“No federal statute authorizes a damages action by 
a foreign citizen injured on foreign soil by a federal law enforcement officer under these circum-
stances.  Thus, plaintiff’s recovery for damages is possible only if the federal courts approve a 
Bivens implied cause of action.”).   
 203.  The Court has recognized deterrence through judicial accountability in other instances.  See 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (recognizing “that the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is 
to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectiviely available way—
by removing the incentive to disregard it’” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 
(1960))).   
 204.  See supra note 175.  
 205.  Brief by Border Scholars, supra note 175, at 2. 
 206.  Id. at 2, 6.  
 207.  Id. at 4; see Steven D. Schwinn, Can the Parents of a Mexican Youth Sue a U.S. Border 
Officer in Federal Court for Fourth and Fifth Amendment Violations After the Officer Shot and 
Killed the Youth While the Officer Was on the U.S. Side of the Border, but the Youth Was on the 
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immediate remedy will have far reaching effects on both American and Mex-
ican nationals.208 
B.  Finding a Solution Through Boumediene 
As described in Part II,209 there are two modern approaches to the extra-
territorial application of the Constitution—the significant voluntary connec-
tions test established in United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez210 and the objec-
tive factor analysis applied in Boumediene v. Bush.211  While these positions 
seem directly at odds with each other, as one incorporates the functional ap-
proach and the other adopts the formalist interpretation, the Court failed to 
proclaim which is the commanding inquiry and avoided applying either to 
determine the Fourth Amendment’s extraterritorial reach.212  This Section 
will argue that Boumediene should have controlled,213 and then it will apply 
the Boumediene objective factor test to conclude the Fourth Amendment ex-
tends extraterritorially under the facts of the instant case.214  Its extraterrito-
rial reach will provide the basis of a civil cause of action that will serve as a 
remedy for Hernández’s family and a deterrence for Border Patrol Agents 
from continuing the use of excessive force.215 
1.  Boumediene Controls 
Instead of declining to address the issue in its entirety, the Court should 
have applied the functionalist analysis established in Boumediene to deter-
mine the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment over the for-
malist approach established earlier in Verdugo–Urquidez for two reasons.  
First, Boumediene essentially overrules the significant voluntary connections 
test used in Verdugo–Urquidez to apply the Fourth Amendment extraterrito-
rially because its strict territorial approach is at odds with the more recent 
                                                          
Mexican Side?, 44 PREVIEW OF U.S. S. CT. CASES 145, 145–46 (2017) (explaining how a cellphone 
video disproves the Government’s position that Hernández was throwing rocks at Agent Mesa); see, 
e.g., Dolven, supra note 200 (telling the stories of individuals killed by Border Patrol agents); AM. 
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF N.M., supra note 173  (providing the facts of fatal encounters with Border 
Patrol agents from 2010 to 2016). 
 208.  Brief by Border Scholars, supra note 175, at 4. 
 209.  See supra Section II.C. 
 210.  494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 211.  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 212.  See Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 265–66 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining how 
courts have attempted to reconcile Verdugo–Urquidez with the newer functionalist precedent estab-
lished in Boumediene in the absence of direction from the Court), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 117 (5th 
Cir. 2015).  
 213.  See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 214.  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 215.  Id. 
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decision’s functional objective factor analysis.216  As the Fifth Circuit’s panel 
opinion recognized, “[T]he Boumediene Court appear[ed] to repudiate the 
formalistic reasoning of Verdugo–Urquidez[].”217 
Second, even if Verdugo–Urquidez is still good law, its significant vol-
untary connections test is minimally persuasive because it was decided by 
plurality and has been recognized as dicta by lower courts.218  In addition, the 
facts of the instant case are distinguishable from those in Verdugo–Urquidez, 
as that case involved a warrantless search of property,219 while the instant 
case revolves around the use of unreasonable lethal force, triggering the pro-
hibition of excessive force proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.220  There-
fore, in either circumstance, the Court should have relied on the Boumediene 
analysis. 
2.  Applying Boumediene 
By using the Boumediene analysis, the Court should have concluded the 
Fourth Amendment applied extraterritorially.  The Boumediene Court pro-
vided three objective factors for consideration: “(1) the citizenship and status 
of the [victim] and the adequacy of the process through which that status 
determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where [the incident] took 
                                                          
 216.  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 (holding that the “questions of extraterritoriality turn on 
objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism”).  
 217.  Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 265; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution 
After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 272 (2009) (explaining how “Boumediene pro-
vides a long overdue repudiation of Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo–Urquidez”).  
 218.  D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented Immigrants and 
the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 90 (2011) (noting, “[m]any courts . . . [have] char-
acterize[ed] the ‘substantial connections’ test as mere dictum in a divided opinion”); see, e.g., United 
States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (emphasizing that “a majority of the 
justices did not subscribe to Chief Rehnquist’s opinion” before declining to follow the rule estab-
lished in Verdugo–Urquidez), rev’d on other grounds, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Colo. 1992) (recognizing, before rejecting its application to the 
case at hand, that the holding in Verdugo–Urquidez was “not joined by the majority of the justices”), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993).  But see Gaylor v. United States, 74. 
F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (announcing that “this court considers itself bound by Supreme Court 
dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and 
not enfeebled by later statements”).  
 219.  United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (“The question presented 
by this case is whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States 
agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 220.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2004, (2017) (stating that the second question pre-
sented asked: “Whether the shooting violated the victim’s Fourth Amendment rights” (emphasis 
added)).  
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place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the [victim’s] en-
titlement to” Fourth Amendment protections.221  The following subsections 
will apply each factor in turn. 
a.  Citizenship & Status of Hernández 
It is undisputed that Hernández is not a United States citizen.222  
Boumediene, however, makes clear that citizenship is “not dispositive” by 
providing constitutional protection to “a limited ‘class of noncitizens.’”223  
By extending the Constitutional protections to Hernández, a similar limited 
class of noncitizens would be established, those that live their daily lives on 
and around the border.  Furthermore, the citizenship of Hernández was un-
known to Agent Mesa at the time of the shooting.224  This exemplifies the 
need to create such a class of protected noncitizens, or at least requires a re-
stricted emphasis placed on this factor when used in the border context, be-
cause it is nearly impossible to determine the citizenship of individuals cross-
ing the border before excessive force is employed due to the daily 
intermingling of both American and Mexican citizens.225  Lastly, Hernán-
dez’s status as “a civilian killed outside an occupied zone or theater of war” 
weighs in his favor.226 
b.  Nature of the Culvert & Surrounding Border Area 
In considering the nature of the site where the incident occurred, the 
Boumediene court emphasized that de jure sovereignty is not the “only rele-
vant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitu-
tion.”227  Instead, the analysis focuses on the control exerted by the United 
States over the particular area and whether the United States “intend[s] to 
govern indefinitely.”228  Border patrol agents work within feet of the border 
                                                          
 221.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.  
 222.  Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 268 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 
117 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 223.  Id. (applying the citizenship prong of the Boumediene analysis).  The class created in 
Boumediene were the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  Id.; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732. 
 224.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2009 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 225.  See supra notes 205–207 and accompanying text.  
 226.   See Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 268–69 (distinguishing Hernández’s status from the ‘“enemy 
aliens’ detained during the Allied Powers’ post-World War II occupation in Eisentrager” and the 
‘enemy combatants’ held pursuant to the Authorization of Use of Military Force in Boumediene” 
within the context of the War on Terror (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66 
(1950)); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734, 767).  
 227.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.  
 228.  Id. at 768–69. 
 856 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:832 
 
every day, maintaining a “heavy presence” over the entire border area.229  
Specifically, agents frequently “exercise hard power across the border,” such 
as aggressive or coercive tactics, and regularly do their job over the line by 
conducting “preinspection[s]” before allowing individuals or vehicles to 
cross into the United States.230  As explained by the Chief of United States 
Border Patrol, “U.S. border security policy ‘extends [the nation’s] zone of 
security outward, ensuring that our physical border is not the first or last line 
of defense, but one of many.’”231 
The control exerted by United States’ officials is not a recent develop-
ment, as the United States has historically had a “constant presence on both 
sides of the line.”232  Like the Boumediene Court’s description of Guan-
tanamo Bay, the United States’ presence and control over the southwest bor-
der can be similarly characterized as not “transient” since “[i]n every practi-
cal sense [the border] . . . is within the constant jurisdiction of the United 
States.”233  As the Fifth Circuit concluded, “[E]ven though the United States 
has no formal control or de facto sovereignty over the Mexican side of the 
border, the heavy presence and regular activity of federal agents across a per-
manent border without any . . . accountability weigh in favor of recognizing 
some constitutional reach.”234  Nonetheless, Agent Mesa was, in fact, within 
the territory of the United States when the act was committed, indicating his 
conduct was entirely controlled by the authority of the United States.235 
While not explicitly required by the Boumediene Court, a court should 
consider the features of the culvert and the surrounding community when 
determining the nature of the site where the incident took place to provide a 
complete picture of the area under examination.  The surrounding area rep-
resents a binational community, consisting of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad 
Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico, that cannot simply be divided by an invisible 
line.236  A recent poll found there is a “sense of community and dependency 
                                                          
 229.  Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 269–70; see U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., BORDER PATROL 
STRATEGIC PLAN 18 (2012–2016), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bp_strate-
gic_plan.pdf (explaining the objective to expand the enforcement presence on and around the South-
west border). 
 230.  Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 269, 270 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b) (1997)).  
 231.  Id. at 270 (quoting Securing Our Borders—Operational Control and the Path Forward: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border and Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th 
Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of Michael J. Fisher, Chief of United States Border Patrol)) (alterations 
omitted).  
 232.  Eva L. Britran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and Foreign Nationals 
on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 244–46 (2014) (“Since the mid-nine-
teenth century, the United States has wielded military, political, and economic authority over north-
ern Mexico.”).  
 233.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69. 
 234.  Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 270.  
 235.  Id. at 269. 
 236.  Brief by Border Scholars, supra note 175, at 2, 14.  
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between [these] sister cities across the border.”237  The interconnectedness of 
the two cities and their lack of awareness of the artificial border claiming to 
separate them can be demonstrated in a variety of ways: eligible Mexican 
students who attend University of Texas at El Paso pay in-state tuition;238 
there are regular joint cultural celebrations and activities, such as the Run 
International United States-Mexico 10K239 and the blended El Dia de los 
Muertos celebrations;240 and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico switched to 
daylight savings because children began showing up an hour early for 
school.241  Furthermore, there are a number of cross-border institutions that 
work together to solve collective problems.242  Specifically, and most note-
worthy, the culvert was built and is now maintained by a joint United States-
Mexico boundary commission.243  The commission contains “representatives 
of both nations” and exercises control of the border area of the culvert.244  
Relatedly, as Justice Breyer explained, this portion of the culvert is a “limi-
trophe” area,245 which is subjected to “co-operation and good neighborli-
ness.”246  Additionally, as Justice Breyer also illustrated, the actual borderline 
is ambiguous, as “[i]t does not itself contain any physical features of a bor-
der.”247  Instead, fences lie on either side of the culvert delineating the two 
countries.248  As Border Patrol itself has recognized,249 it is impossible to 
identify where the actual borderline is situated.250  When considering the im-
                                                          
 237.  Alfredo Corchado, Common Ground, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July 18, 2016), http://in-
teractives.dallasnews.com/2016/border-poll/.  
 238.  Brief by Border Scholars, supra note 175, at 11–12. 
 239.  Id. at 12.  The run “begins in El Paso, crosses the Stanton Street Bridge into downtown 
Juárez, and then turns back to a finish line at the summit of the Paso del Norte Bridge (the bridge 
beside which Sergio Hernández was killed).”  Id. 
 240.  Id.  
 241.  Id. at 13.  
 242.  See, e.g., id. at 18–20 (describing the United States-Mexico Border Governors Conference, 
the United States-Mexico Border Legislative Conference, and the collaboration between emergency 
services).  
 243.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2009 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 244.  Id. at 2010.  
 245.  See supra note 163 (defining “limitrophe”); see also Jennifer Pitt, Dredging for Diplo-
macy? Colorado River Management at the United States-Mexico Border, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE 
GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 47, 47 (2006) (explaining that limitrophe is “a unique nomenclature that 
means ‘at the border’ in both English and Spanish”).  
 246.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2010 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 247.  Id. at 2009. 
 248.  Id.  
 249.  See Border Patrol Overview, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT. 
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview#wcm-survey-target-id (last vis-
ited Mar. 27, 2018) (describing the borderline as “barely discernible”). 
 250.  See Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2009, 2010–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the nature 
of the actual borderline). 
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moderate amount of control the United States exerts over this closely inter-
twined area, in which the borderline has become a fruitless feature, it seems 
this is precisely the type of zone that deserves constitutional protection—an 
area where it is impossible to determine where the Constitution stops and 
where it begins. 
c.  Practical Obstacles to Affording Hernández Fourth 
Amendment Protections 
To determine whether there are practical obstacles involved in extend-
ing constitutional protections, the Court considers a broad range of potential 
barriers relevant to the constitutional provision at issue.251  Those discussed 
in this Subsection include the possibility of (1) additional expenditures and 
undue burdens, (2) conflicts with other nations, and (3) adverse consequences 
that may emerge in future contexts.  This Subsection will also explore the 
practical effects involved in failing to extend Fourth Amendment protections 
in the context of this case. 
First, extending Fourth Amendment protections would not “require ex-
penditure of funds by the Government and [would not] divert the attention of 
[Border Patrol] personnel from other pressing tasks.”252  The right would 
merely provide a means of recourse and a method of deterrence, simply by 
making Border Patrol agents think carefully before using their weapons in 
unreasonable circumstances.253  Nonetheless, even if some costs and diver-
sions did arise, they would require no more than an “incremental expenditure 
of resources.”254  Relatedly, extending a remedy through the Fourth Amend-
ment would not hinder Border Patrol agents’ ability to do their job because 
they would still be permitted to use force under reasonable circumstances and 
deadly force when necessary—a standard they should already be applying.255  
No additional burden, therefore, would be placed on the agents. 
                                                          
 251.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769–70.  
 252.  Id. at 769.  The Boumediene court in fact recognized that extending the habeas corpus 
privileges to detainees “may require expenditure of funds by the Government and may divert the 
attention of military personnel from other pressing tasks” but nonetheless granted detainees this 
right by explaining that this consideration is not “dispositive.”  Id.  
 253.  Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 30 (“[T]he prospect of civil liability 
plays a proper and important role in deterring Border Patrol officers from using excessive force in 
confrontations with individuals at and across the border.”).  
 254.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769. 
 255.  See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., USE OF FORCE POLICY, GUIDELINES AND 
PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 1, 3 (2014), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Useof-
ForcePolicyHandbook.pdf (proscribing that agents may use “‘objectively reasonable’ force only 
when it is necessary to carry out their law enforcement duties” and that they may use deadly force 
“only when necessary, that is, when the officer/agent has a reasonable belief that the subject of such 
force poses an imminent danger of serious physical injury or death to the officer/agent or to another 
person”).  
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Second, extending Fourth Amendment protections would not “cause 
friction” with Mexico.256  In fact, as set out in the Amicus Brief filed in sup-
port of Hernández by Mexico, “[A]pplying U.S. law in this case would not 
interfere with operations of the Mexican government within Mexico . . . [but 
would instead] show appropriate respect for Mexico’s sovereignty on its own 
territory and for the rights of its nationals.”257  Mexico further explained that 
applying the Constitution in this case would not infringe upon Mexico’s sov-
ereignty.258  Notably, Mexico clarified, “Any invasion of Mexico’s sover-
eignty occurred when Agent Mesa shot his gun across the border at Sergio 
Hernández—not when the boy’s parents sought to hold Agent Mesa respon-
sible for his actions.”259  Similarly, there are reciprocity implications in-
volved, as the United States would expect Mexico to hold its agents account-
able if similar situations occurred in reverse.260 
Third, the concerns surrounding Border Patrol’s, and other United States 
agencies’, increased use of “sophisticated systems of surveillance” and the 
implications that may result if the Fourth Amendment is extended into the 
border zone are unfounded.261  The right could be narrowly construed to ap-
ply where it is needed the most—in the immediate border vicinity.  Addition-
ally, the facts of the instant case limit its holding only to those subjected to 
excessive deadly force by Border Patrol agents and not to circumstances of 
warrantless searches that may result from the use of advanced surveillance 
technology.262  Therefore, the right would not reach those outside this limited 
class of non-citizens—those within close proximity to the border and a victim 
of a Border Patrol agent’s excessive use of force.263 
                                                          
 256.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.  
 257.  Brief of the Government of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 4, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118) [hereinafter Brief by 
Mexico]. 
 258.  Id. at 7. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  See id. at 3 (“The United States would expect no less if the situation were reversed and a 
Mexican government agent, standing in Mexico and shooting across the border, had killed a U.S. 
national standing on U.S. soil.”).  
 261.  Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 267 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining “[t]hese sophis-
ticated systems of surveillance might carry with them a host of implications for the Fourth Amend-
ment[,] . . . [as they could] ‘disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situa-
tions involving our national interest’ and could also plunge Border Patrol agents ‘into a sea of 
uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad” 
(first citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); and then quoting United States v. Ver-
dugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1990), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015))).  
 262.  See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Routine searches 
of the persons and effects of [those at the border] are not subject to any requirement of reasonable 
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.”).  
 263.  See also Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 12-50217, slip op. at 26 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018) (Prado, 
J., dissenting) (noting “Hernandez’s parents do not seek to hold any high-level officials liable for 
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By not extending Fourth Amendment protections in this case, a number 
of practical concerns emerge.  Failing “to apply the Fourth Amendment to 
the culvert,” Justice Breyer explained, “would produce serious anomalies.”264  
The actions of Agent Mesa remain the same no matter what side of the indis-
cernible borderline he was on—the “lethal impact” does not vary.265  Consid-
ering the vast number of people who cross the border every day, the anoma-
lous effects are only likely to multiply.266  As Justice Breyer reasoned, “It 
does not make much sense to distinguish for Fourth Amendment purposes 
among these many thousands of individuals on the basis of an invisible line 
of which none of them is aware.”267  Through the application of the 
Boumediene factor analysis, the Court should have concluded the Fourth 
Amendment reached Hernández and, accordingly, extends to those who may 
find themselves in similar circumstances. 
C.  Fourth Amendment Historical Considerations 
Providing a remedy in this instance is not at odds with the Fourth 
Amendment, as Verdugo–Urquidez would suggest, but is actually consistent 
with the Amendment’s historical purpose.  As used by the Fifth Circuit to 
deny Hernández Fourth Amendment protections,268 the Verdugo–Urquidez 
approach focuses on the Fourth Amendment’s use of the phrase “the people” 
and concludes it only refers to citizens of the United States.269  Under this 
approach, noncitizens, at least those without significant voluntary connec-
tions, cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment because its protections do not 
reach those outside of “the people.”270 
When the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment, however, their fun-
damental aim was to curb unfettered power exercised by the government.271  
More precisely, the “founders sought to guarantee a general right of secu-
rity . . . through the enforcement of policies and procedures capable of con-
straining government agents and limiting the discretionary authority of those 
                                                          
the acts of their subordinates . . . [but] are suing an individual federal agent for his own actions” 
(emphasis added)). 
 264.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2010 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 265.  Brief by Mexico, supra note 257, at 8.  
 266.  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2010 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 267.  Id. at 2011.  
 268.  Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 266 (5th Cir. 2014).   
 269.  Id. at 263. 
 270.  See id. at 263 (explaining this textual approach).  
 271.  DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 154 (2017) 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment was motivated by founding-era struggles with abuses of power.”); see 
id. at 69–70 (explaining how the Fourth Amendment specifically arose as a response to “experiences 
in England and the colonies with general warrants and writs of assistance,” which “provided exec-
utive agents with what amounted to unlimited licenses to conduct searches and seizures without fear 
of being held accountable for their conduct”). 
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wielding the truncheon of state power.”272  Granting Hernández’s family the 
ability to bring their suit under the Fourth Amendment would, accordingly, 
create a means of deterrence to dissuade Border Patrol agents from abusing 
the power bestowed upon them.273  In other words, it would create a “proce-
dure[] capable of constraining government agents.”274  The protection of the 
“state of security and tranquility” the Fourth Amendment attempts to pre-
serve is, therefore, furthered by limiting the insecurity that a Border Patrol 
agent may take the life of another under unreasonable circumstances with 
immunity.275 
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment right at question here is not an in-
dividual right, but it is a collective right held by “those who compose a com-
munity.”276  Hernández, while disqualified from “the people,” is nonetheless 
a representative of the collective subject to Border Patrol’s authority.  Hold-
ing Agent Mesa liable for his actions against Hernández, therefore, protects 
this community as a whole and serves to impose restraints on the overreach-
ing authority the Fourth Amendment prohibits. 
As these historical considerations have illuminated, the central question 
revolves around the conduct of the government actor and less on the status of 
the victim.  Agent Mesa’s use of excessive deadly force in this case is, ac-
cordingly, in direct conflict with the essential purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment—irrespective of Hernandez’s nationality.  Providing a remedy in this 
instance aligns precisely with the Framers’ intentions when drafting the 
Fourth Amendment.277 
  
                                                          
 272.  Id. at 169.  
 273.  See Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 3 (arguing that the “because of 
the conditions within the Border Patrol, similar incidents will likely continue to occur if agents 
cannot be held accountable in civil suits”).  
 274.  GRAY, supra note 271, at 169. 
 275.  Id. at 157. 
 276.  Id. at 147–48 (describing that the inclusion of “the” before “people” signifies that it refers 
to a right of collective protection).   
 277.  See supra note 271–272 and accompanying text. 
 862 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:832 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Hernandez v. Mesa,278 the Court declined to address whether the 
Fourth Amendment extended steps across the border to protect Hernández 
from Agent Mesa’s deadly use of force.279  Agent Mesa’s actions were not an 
anomaly but were instead an example of a much larger problem—the chronic 
use of excessive force by Border Patrol agents and the lack of recourse avail-
able to victims.280  Presented with an opportunity through the instant case, the 
Court should have provided a mechanism of deterrence and redress by estab-
lishing the basis for a civil remedy.281  By applying the functionalist approach 
established in Boumediene, the Court had the means to reach the conclusion 
that the Fourth Amendment applies to the limited class of non-citizens sub-
jected to Border Patrol’s authority.282  This conclusion reflects the Framer’s 
intended purpose of the Fourth Amendment—to prevent government offi-
cials from abusing the discretionary power that thwarts the ability of the peo-
ple to feel secure.283  To curb the excessive force used at the border and to 
prevent others from meeting the same harrowing end as Hernández, the Con-
stitution must extend as far as the bullet can travel. 
                                                          
 278.  137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).  
 279.  Hernandez, 136 S. Ct. at 2008.  
 280.  See supra Part IV.   
 281.  See supra Part IV.  
 282.  See supra Section IV.B.  
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